Syria after Assad: The winners for now are Turkey and the West

Syria stood alongside Iran during its invasion by Saddam Hussein, and Iran, in turn, stood with the Syrian and Iraqi governments during the assault by the Islamic State (IS) group and al-Qaeda on Syria and Iraq from 2011 to 2017.

The alliance of Russia, Iran and the Axis of Resistance led to the defeat of militant groups and the preservation of the sovereignty of these two Arab countries.

However, at the same time, Assad’s government had no alignment with democracy, and western and Arab leaders were fearful and angry about the extensive presence and influence of Iran and Russia in Syria. In any case, the overthrow of the Syrian political system has created a major shift in the region’s geopolitics.

In the short term, Iran, Russia, Iraq and the Axis of Resistance will be the main losers from Assad’s downfall.

The collapse of the Assad government will be a major blow to the axis, weakening Iran’s geopolitical influence in the region.

Syria has been the only land route for the supply and transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, and cutting off this route not only creates a strategic challenge for Hezbollah but also weakens Iran’s leverage in the Palestinian issue.

Moreover, the potential spread of insecurity to Iraq and Iran – and the weakening of Iran’s diplomatic support – are significant consequences for Iran and the axis.

Turkey main winner

The fall of the Syrian government could also pose threats to Iraq’s security, both in terms of the Kurdish region and from the aspirations of extremist groups for Sunni-majority areas in the country, as well as the potential activation of IS sleeper cells.

In the short term, Israel might find an opportunity to further weaken Hezbollah and the axis in the entire region.

In the short term, the US and the West will be winners because the fall of Assad will significantly reduce Russian and Iranian influence in the region.

However, the Islamist group that seized Damascus and toppled Assad, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), was proscribed as a terror organisation by the UK in 2017 and the US in 2018 because of its links to al-Qaeda. HTS is led by Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (real name Ahmed al-Sharaa), who was designated a terrorist by the US in 2013.

It is uncertain how the collapse of Syria’s secular government and the rise of Islamists will impact the US’s long-term interests, with the differing perspectives between the US and Turkey on the Kurdish issue, the ambiguity surrounding the future actions of the opposition and the prospect of increasing instability in the region.

Turkey is the main winner. Ankara may hope to resolve the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey, exert more effective control over the Kurds and strengthen its role in the Palestinian issue, as well as cement alliances with like-minded groups in the region.

The opposition’s conflicts with the Kurds and Turkey’s stance alone pose a major obstacle to establishing a consensus-based order

While Arab countries are also pleased with the reduction of Iran’s influence in Syria, the military operations of HTS and other militant groups were managed and organised by Turkey, all of which have an affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Several Arab countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Jordan, are opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood and its ideology. Therefore, Turkey’s power projection in the region and the Brotherhood’s potential future dominance in Syria could be perceived as a new threat by some Arab countries.

Regarding the political future of Syria, two scenarios can be imagined: a peaceful transition to a new system; or a Libyan and Sudanese-style outcome.

A peaceful transition could be achieved if the opposition continues with its moderate rhetoric and actions. However, it is composed of diverse and fragmented groups that have united solely to eliminate a common enemy.

Even if there are no internal disagreements among the opposition, their conflicts with the Kurds and Turkey’s stance on this issue alone pose a major obstacle to establishing a consensus-based order. This could keep Syria in a prolonged political and security crisis, similar to Libya and Sudan.

Another important factor is the conflicting interests of the many external actors, who will each try to increase their influence over Syria’s situation in various ways.

In any scenario, future developments in Syria will have a significant impact on the region’s geopolitics. Therefore, finding a solution that is acceptable to both regional and global powers is crucial.

In April 2017, at the Carnegie Conference in Washington, I proposed 10 principles for resolving the Syrian crisis: 1) Resolving the Syrian crisis through diplomacy, not war; 2) A face-saving solution for all the main parties involved;  3) Serious and collective cooperation to eradicate terrorism from Syria; 4) Preserving Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; 5) Preventing the collapse of the Syrian army and security institutions; 6) Forming an inclusive government in Syria; 7) Building a new Syria based on the will and vote of the majority of the Syrian nation; 8) Ensuring the protection of minorities in Syria; 9) Holding free elections under the supervision of the United Nations regarding the new government and constitution of Syria; 10) A comprehensive package of economic aid for Syria’s reconstruction, the return of refugees, and other humanitarian issues.

Although there was no receptive ear for these ideas at that time, today, these 10 principles could still be a comprehensive and sustainable package to resolve the Syrian crisis.